





Centre for Transition Economics 
 
 





Discussion Paper  176/2006 
 
 













Katholieke Universiteit Leuven 
 
 
LICOS  Centre for Transition Economics 




TEL:+32-(0)16 32 65 98 
FAX:+32-(0)16 32 65 99 
http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/licos 
 
 Did US Safeguard Protection on Steel Aﬀect
Market Power of European Steel Producers?∗
Hylke Vandenbussche† and Ziga Zarnic‡
First version: December 2005; Current version: August 2006
Abstract
This paper empirically investigates the eﬀects of US safeguard protection on steel imports
in 2002 on the mark-ups of EU steel producers. We identify a large panel of European steel
producers between 1995 and 2004 aﬀected by the safeguards. Using the Roeger method, our
results show that US safeguards signiﬁcantly reduced EU ﬁrms’ mark-ups. Single-product EU
steel ﬁrms suﬀered relatively more from the protection than multi-product ﬁrms. Controlling
for ﬁrm heterogeneity, these results are robust to alternative speciﬁcations. Our evidence
f u r t h e rs u g g e s t st h a tU Sp r o t e c t i o nr e s u l t e di n some rerouting of European steel especially
towards China, aggravating the situation on the Chinese steel market and ultimately resulting
in Chinese trade protection of steel imports.
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In March 2002, the US government imposed safeguard protection on imports of certain steel prod-
ucts under initiative of the domestic industry. Such administered protection is permitted under
the GATT/WTO rules in order to limit imports of goods that seriously injure or threat to injure
domestic industry. Safeguard measures (SG), together with antidumping (AD), have become the
prevalent instruments for enforcing new import restrictions. In this paper, we examine the eﬀect
of US safeguard protection on mark-ups of European steel producers of subject products.
The theoretical model used in this paper is well known in the international trade literature.
We introduce a safeguard tariﬀ into the reciprocal dumping model (Brander, 1981, Brander and
Krugman, 1983). Our model predicts that European steel producers should be adversely aﬀected
by US safeguard measures through cost and demand side channels. The former is a direct eﬀect
of the protection on European exporters of steel as they partially absorb the US safeguard tariﬀ.
The latter channel operates through trade rerouting facilitated by US safeguard protection. As
the EU experiences an increase in the level of import penetration, mark-ups of EU steel ﬁrms are
squeezed whilst the US tariﬀ has no direct eﬀect on the EU price for steel. Using the Roeger
(1995) methodology, our estimation results conﬁrm the theoretical predictions. We ﬁnd a negative
eﬀect of US safeguards on mark-ups of EU steel producers. Mark-ups are decreasing with import
penetration and the level of safeguard tariﬀs, whereas single-product ﬁrms suﬀer more from US
safeguard protection. Controlling for unobservable ﬁrm heterogeneity with ﬁxed eﬀects, these
results are robust to alternative speciﬁcations.
This paper contributes to the literature on trade protection and ﬁrm related aspects. We distin-
guish between two main streams in the literature to motivate our empirical ﬁndings. The ﬁrst type
of studies looks at the implications of administered trade protection for domestic industries or ﬁrms.
The second, refers to the externalities of trade protection. Though following diﬀerent objectives
than antidumping measures, safeguard measures are likely to restrict trade and raise mark-ups of
protected ﬁrms1. While the purpose of antidumping protection lies behind sanctioning free trade
violations, safeguard protection aims at providing space for adjustment and technological catch-up
within industries. US industries ﬁled in the eighties more antidumping than safeguard petitions
and the success rate for antidumping (63 percent) has shown to be higher than for safeguard (26
1Both measures may result in ad valorem tariﬀs, expressed as a percentage of CIF import price. However,
antidumping (AD) and countervailing (CVD) measures are distinguishable from safeguard measures in their attempt
to remedy injury caused by dumping or actionable subsidies. While "red and yellow" subsidies, such as export
subsidies, can be countervailed, the "green-light" subsidies, such as construction subsidies, cannot be countervailed.
Safeguard protection is not based upon selectivity principles, it covers larger scope of products or industries, and
is rarely extended. Sunset clauses deﬁne the upper limit of 5 years of antidumping protection, while safeguard
protection is typically administered for only 4 years and results in lower duties. In the US, safeguard protection is
much harder to obtain, because it requires the approval of the President, whereas antidumping protection is approved
by Department of Commerce.
1percent) petitions2. More recent literature provides the evidence that some countries are increasing
their usage of safeguards as well3. It suggests that either strictness of injury criteria (Baldwin,
1988) or retaliation threat (Blonigen and Bown, 2003) condition the decision of which measure to
be imposed. Following Hartigan (2002), the ﬁling decision depends largely on procedural diﬀerences
between AD and safeguard measures. Before ﬁling for protection, ﬁrms will take into account the
duration, the level of duties, and diﬃculties to obtain protection. Filing for safeguard protection
must meet the serious injury condition, which is much higher standard than material injury condi-
tion under AD legislation. Firms will consider ﬁling for safeguard protection only if the expected
value of protection is higher relative to AD protection.
Feenstra (1995) and Gawande and Krishna (2003) document well the ﬁrst branch of economic
literature on the impacts of trade remedy measures, like antidumping and countervailing measures,
on the performance of domestic ﬁrms. The evidence suggests that mark-ups fall with trade lib-
eralization, since foreign competition increases the elasticity of demand that domestic ﬁrms face4.
Konings and Vandenbussche (2005) conﬁrm the positive relationship between import tariﬀsa n d
prices of imperfectly competitive domestic industries. Using the capital market approach applied
in the international trade context, Hartigan, Kamma, and Perry (1989) and Lenway et al. (1990)
provide the evidence that mark-ups may change due to altered market structure leading to abnormal
returns.
There has been relatively little work done to explore the extent of externalities due to ad-
ministered trade protection. Unilaterally imposed safeguard measures temporarily disrupt the
multilateral framework including trading agreements previously negotiated between the importing
and exporting Members of the WTO. Safeguard protection is imposed on all imports regardless
of source. As such, it generates more externalities for non-protected markets than AD protection.
Bown and Crowley (2005) address the impact of one country’s use of an import restricting trade
policy on a foreign country’s exports to third markets. They show that US import restrictions
both depress Japanese export ﬂows to the US and deﬂect them to third countries. The intent of
US safeguards was to provide incentives for the domestic industry to renovate technologies and
gain the competitive edge. Miyagiwa and Ohno (1995) ﬁnd that safeguards provide an incentive for
2Hansen and Prusa (1995) ﬁnd that US safeguard measures from 1980 to 1988 decreased trade volumes by an
average of 34 percent. Moreover, over the same period, they ﬁnd that trade volumes fell by an average of only eleven
percent when the government imposed an antidumping duty.
3Bown and Crowley (2005) show that the United States imposed only seven safeguard measures in 1980-1994,
while in 1994-1999 they imposed ﬁve safeguard measures.
4The evidence on decreasing mark-ups due to trade liberalization is documented in Levinsohn (1993), Harrison
(1994), Feenstra (1995), Krishna and Mitra (1998), and Gawande and Krishna (2003). The impacts of trade liber-
alization on price mark-ups through the elasticity of demand have been modelled extensively in the literature under
several assumptions, e.g. on substitution between foreign and domestic goods (Devarajan and Rodrik, 1991), type
of protection (Bhagwati, 1978), variety of goods (Krugman, 1979), market concentration (Helpman and Krugman,
1989), collusive outcomes (Staiger and Wolak, 1989; Prusa, 1994; Vandenbussche and Veugelers, 1999).
2protected ﬁrms to innovate quickly only if the cost of the new technology is falling over time and the
termination date for safeguard protection is credibly enforced by foreign retaliation. Furthermore,
Crowley (2002) suggests that a non-discriminatory safeguard tariﬀ can accelerate technology adop-
tion by a domestic import-competing ﬁrm, but will slow down technology adoption by a foreign
ﬁrm. However for ﬁrms far from the technological frontier, safeguard protection can lower present
value of exit costs by spreading them over longer periods instead of allowing for catch-up (Hartigan,
2005).
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂyo v e r v i e w sU Sa n dE U
steel industries and presents the event surrounding the imposition of US safeguard protection. In
Section 3 we present a simple theoretical framework to provide the intuition for the empirical
analysis. Section 4 discusses earlier literature on estimating mark-ups and develops the empirical
model based on the Roeger (1995) approach. Further, we describe data and discuss estimation
results. Section 5 concludes with a brief summary of our results.
2 T h eM a r k e tf o rS t e e la n dU SS a f e g u a r dP r o t e c t i o n
2.1 The Steel Industry
One year before US safeguard protection, the world manufacturers were on average exploiting
only 77 percent of their capacities and several US integrated manufacturers went bankrupt. Less
eﬃcient US steel producers were selling below their production costs and in 2001 experienced on
average $57 loss per one tonne of steel manufactured. There are two types of steel producers in
the US steel sector, integrated and non-integrated producers or minimills. The latter are ﬂexible
and cost eﬀective small producers, specialized in certain products that use newer technologies,
enabling higher productivity than integrated producers have. On the other hand, there are large
labor and capital-intensive integrated ﬁrms producing a broad range of products, using outdated
technologies and employing unionized labor force, therefore being cost ineﬃcient and less productive
than competitive industries. The level of average production costs for integrated producers has
been much higher than for the largest US steel importers. In fact, their eﬃciency level remained on
average rather constant. By contrast, minimills increased their production eﬃciency by almost 10
percent from 1998 to 2001 and were even more eﬃcient than most of US steel importers (Worldsteel,
2006).
US minimills were in their growth stage, having a ﬁve times larger domestic market share
than two decades ago, while integrated producers were in their retrenchment state, loosing their
domestic market share from about 50 to 25 percent in the same period. The latter are large
3employers that frequently ﬁle petitions to the US International Trade Commission (ITC) and lobby
for favorable legislative restrictions (Lenway et al., 1990). Although the primary goal of trade
restrictions and domestic subventions regards the maintenance of domestic producers’ competitive
edge, the integrated producers have remained largely noncompetitive despite $15 billion "green-
light" subsidies received in the last two decades.
The EU steel industry has since the eighties undergone a complete restructuring5.Am a r k e t -
orientated policy accompanied deregulation, privatization, reduction of government involvement,
and removal of most external trade restrictions. The restructuring process required large R&D
investments, accounting for EUR 2.5 billion subsidies over 1995-1999. It enabled developing of
newer technologies enabling higher cost eﬃciency and productivity of EU steel producers. A 20
percent production growth in the last decade was accompanied by a 40 percent reduction in the
labor force down to about 270 thousands compared to one million employed in the early seventies.
The restructuring process also reduced capacity by almost two million tons in the nineties (ECSC,
2005).
In order to understand diﬀerences between US and EU industries, it is helpful to obtain further
insights from the manufacturing process. Subject products can be manufactured in blast furnaces,
basic oxygen or open-heart furnaces, and electric furnaces using either scrap steel or iron ore
and coal. In contrast to US integrated producers, the competitive US minimills and EU producers
mainly apply newer technologies, i.e. processing scrap steel in electric furnaces, that are less capital
and labor intensive and therefore allow for higher cost eﬃciency and productivity.
An important distinction between US and EU steel industries is that the latter has accomplished
its restructuring process without any import restrictions. By accounting for almost two percent of
the value added and employing 1.5 percent of employment in the EU steel manufacturing in 2001,
the EU’s concern can be argued easily. While EU imports have risen by 18 percent through 1998-
2002, have US imports of steel fallen by 33 percent. Additional protection of the US steel market
could consequently result in diversion of steel from the rest of the world to the EU6.A ni n c r e a s e
5The industry consolidation reached its highest momentum in 2006. The world’s steel sector will be in the
future dominated by a small number of global steel players. On present trends, Mittal Steel and Arcelor, both
headquartered in the EU, will surely be one of them. Once the acquisition of the US International Steel Group is
realized, Mittal Steel will be the largest steel producer in the world, with an annual crude steel capacity of 63 million
tons. If the current consolidation process with Arcelor succeeds, the merger will represent the world’s largest steel
corporation in terms of output, assets, and proﬁts, producing more than 110 million tons annually (EC, 2006). Both
companies have large expansion plans. Mittal Steel is not only continuing its acquisition strategy in Central and
Eastern Europe, the group is the ﬁrst foreign steelmaker to invest directly in China with the purchase of 37.17% of
the shares of the Hunan Valin Tube and Wire mill. Arcelor has an aggressive strategy to increase capacity to 53-55
million tons by the end of 2006, which coinsists with joint ventures with Baosteel in China and Jindal in India, and
bids for Erdemir in Turkey and Lucchini-Warsawa in Poland.
6In 2002, the EC estimated diversion could be as much as 15 million tons per year or 56 percent of current import
level (EC, 2006). Producing 193 million tons of crude steel, the EU accounts for 18% of world production. China is
the larger producer with 272 million tons (26% of world production), followed by Japan with 113 million tons and
the US with 99 million tons.
4in the level of competition in the EU market would then exert a disciplining eﬀect on mark-ups of
EU steel producers.
2.2 The Policy Impact
To motivate the theoretical speciﬁcation and facilitate the discussion of empirical results it is
important to brieﬂy summarize the event. US safeguard protection was initiated in March 2002.
The enforcement mechanism was up to the Bush administration and was triggered by the US steel
industry petition ﬁling for safeguard protection. Safeguard protection was imposed on the grounds
of the US International Trade Commission (ITC) examination of competitiveness of the US steel
industry. The ITC established that a surge in imports to the US market was causing serious injury
to the US steel industry due to steel imports from France, Great Britain, Italy, and South Korea
sold at dumping prices7.
The objective of the US safeguards was to facilitate adjustment to higher unanticipated imports
due to the GATT/WTO liberalization agreement and enhance the competitive edge of domes-
tic steel industry that had experienced substantial losses leading to several bankruptcies. The
political-economic reasoning for safeguards is in providing governments a means to address their
redistributive motives or to demonstrate favor to politically preferred interest groups if those groups
have more power than those harmed by the potential use of safeguards (Bown and Crowley, 2005).
As a response to the US trade policy action, the European Commission (EC) ﬁled a complaint at
the WTO and after a while negotiated the retaliation power8. As the US steel industry recovered
and retaliation threats of Co-complainants became unsustainable, the Bush administration dropped
its support for safeguard protection. Although the protection was initially scheduled to expire after
four years, the WTO facilitated its termination by the end of 20039.
Safeguard measures took form of tariﬀs ranging from 8 to 30 percent on 9 categories of steel
products as well as a tariﬀ-rate quota on slabs10. Table 1 describes subject products analyzed in
this paper. The table shows the product, the classiﬁcation of the product within the Harmonized
Tariﬀ Schedule (HTS)11,t h et a r i ﬀ level imposed in two years of safeguard protection, and the
average import market share of the subject product as a percentage of total US imports of steel.
7Certain prerequisites are required for imposition of safeguard measures: ﬁrst, the injury determination, and
second, the determination of surge in imports either absolutely, relatively to the market or its consumption, unan-
ticipated, or non-attributed, if low industry performance is associated with the economic downturns.
8The retaliation power is based upon nulliﬁcation and impairment of expected beneﬁts from trade agreement.
9Safeguard protection is typically imposed for the period of four years with a possible four-year extension.
10Slabs refer to cold- and hot-rolled carbon steel plates and sheets.
11In December 2001, the ITC provided detailed deﬁnitions of products under the Harmonized Tariﬀ Schedule of
the United States (HTS) in Appendix A to its determination, set out at 66 Fed. Reg. 67304, 67308-67311. By
February 2002, the ITC provided additional information in response to a request by the US Trade Representative
under section 203(a)(5) of the Trade Act (19 U.S. 2253(a)(5)).
5[Insert Table 1 here]
The highest tariﬀ levels of 30 and 24 percent were imposed on imports of products that rep-
resented the largest share in US imports, i.e. ﬂat steel and slabs and diﬀerent types of bars and
rods. Nearly two thirds of US total imports were limited by safeguard protection. We report US
import market shares at the beginning of our data sample in 1996 and draw comparisons with a
year before and at the end of protection.
There is a decreasing trend of about 13 percentage points in all subject products with respect to
total US imports. In particular this is due to a decline in the share of ﬂat steel products and slabs
within total US imports. This ﬁgure suggests that a part of imports of ﬂat steel and slabs may
have been diverted to other markets prior the imposition of safeguards in 2002. Observing a 10
percent drop in import shares of all subject products, it seems that US protection only facilitated
trade rerouting of subject products, but not necessarily initiated it in the ﬁrst place.
In Section 4 we examine to what extent increased demand for steel from China justiﬁes this
observation. Between 2001 and 2003, the largest decline is observed in imports of reinforcing
bars (i.e. rebars) and ﬂat steel products. The latter can be explained by high tariﬀ levels. High
substitutability between rebars and other bars, accounts for the decline of their market shares in
total imports. A possible reasoning for protecting diﬀerent types of bars and rods lies in limiting
the substitution between diﬀerent types of rods and bars by foreign competitors.
The following Figure 1 reveals that not only the share of imported subject products in total
US imports decreased, but the latter signiﬁcantly declined in 2002 as well. The magnitude of the
decline is partially due to a large share of subject products in total US imports of steel. Figure
1 graphically presents the evolution of US imports of subject products from the rest of the world.
On average, trade in subject products represented roughly 25 million tons in the past decade.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Two observations come clear from the above ﬁgure based on the US ITC trade data (ITC,
2006). Firstly, there was a declining trend in imports since 1998, which questions the fairness of US
safeguard protection. Secondly, a sharp decline of US imports of subject products in 2003 below its
eight-year value was followed by fast recovery afterwards. Although the trend is largely determined
by ﬂat steel products, it is clear that US safeguards contributed to a decline in imports of all
subject products. Both sharp downturn and recovery imply trade rerouting in these products.
This ﬁnding motivates our analysis, implying that mark-ups of European producers of subject
products may fall after 2002, ﬁrstly, due to decreased import market shares of subject products in
the US and secondly, due to trade rerouting in subject products introducing increased competition
6in the European market for steel. We will consider that European steel producers could have found
it proﬁtable to reroute their exports to non-US markets due to US protection.
3 Theoretical Framework
An economic analysis allows a better understanding of the basic nature of administered protection
that aﬀects market power of foreign ﬁrms. It provides key insights on the eﬀect of US safeguard
tariﬀs on mark-ups of European producers. To illustrate this eﬀect, we base our theoretical consid-
erations on a modiﬁcation of the existing reciprocal dumping model by Brander (1981) and Brander
and Krugman (1983). The novelty of our approach is that it introduces a safeguard tariﬀ imposed
by the US government on each unit of European shipments to the US, denoted by τ.T h i ss i m p l e
model does not intend to provide an exhaustive alternative to existing theoretical models explaining
the eﬀects of protection. In contrast, our aim is to point out that US safeguard protection matters
for the European producer of a like product and it is likely to adversely aﬀect its mark-ups. We
solve for prices and mark-ups as a function of market shares and characterize the channels between
the US safeguard tariﬀ and EU mark-ups.
Suppose for example that an US and an EU ﬁrm produce one subject product with the same
unit variable cost c. Consider that they are located in their home countries, namely the US and
the EU. These countries represent each other’s largest trading partners in the subject product
that is by deﬁnition of the "like-product" rule considered as a homogeneous product12. Imperfect
competition generates trade in this product. While competing in a Cournot fashion in shipments
of the subject product, ﬁrms face iceberg transport costs, so that the marginal cost of exports is
c
g,w h e r e0 ≤ g ≤ 1. It is essential that US and EU markets are segmented, so ﬁrms set prices
i n d e p e n d e n t l yi ne a c hm a r k e t .
The European ﬁrm produces the output x for the European and the output x∗ for the US
market, denoted by the asterisk ∗.T h eU Sﬁrm produces the output y for the European and the
output y∗ for the US market. Each ﬁrm sells its output at the price P i nt h eE Ua n da tt h ep r i c e
P∗ in the US. Each ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁts with respect to the output sold in each market taking
into account shipments of the other competitor, that is:
max
x,x∗π = P(Q)x + P∗(Q∗)x∗ − c(x +
x∗
g
) − F − τx∗ (3.1)
where p(Q) and p∗(Q∗) are the inverse demand functions in EU and US markets, respectively.
12According to the "like product" principle, the WTO makes decisions on the basis of appearance, use, and process
of production. The ﬁrst two considerations are emphasized by the WTO, meaning that if subject products look the
same and are used in the same way, then are considered to be homogeneous.











The European ﬁrm’s market share in the US market is deﬁned by σ∗ = x∗
Q∗ and the US ﬁrm’s
market share in the EU market is deﬁned by σ =
y
Q ,w h e r eQ and Q∗ denote total sales at












ε∗ + σ∗ − 1
(3.5)
and analogously best reply functions can be derived for the EU market. The above equations
imply that the European ﬁrm needs to consider the tariﬀ i m p o s e do ne a c hu n i to fi t so u t p u ts h i p p e d
to the US. The variable cost of the US safeguard tariﬀ thus enters its proﬁt function. The solution
of the best reply functions is the trade equilibrium13.
Comparative Statics for the US Safeguard Tariﬀ
This simple theoretical framework provides us with intuition that the US safeguard tariﬀ will
adversely aﬀect the European ﬁrm’s mark-up. Rewriting best reply functions and solving Equa-
tions (3.4) and (3.5) for price levels and market shares with respect to demand elasticities yields



















∗ < e σ (3.6)












e P∗ > e P (3.7)
The price in the US market will exceed the EU price due to the tariﬀ τ imposed on the US
imports. Under free trade both prices would be equal and ﬁrms would have sold equivalent shares
in exporting markets. By contrast under US safeguard protection, the EU ﬁrm will sell less in the
13See Appendix for a more detailed description of this model.
8US market than the US ﬁrm in the EU market, i.e. e σ
∗ < e σ.E a c h ﬁrm will export as long as it
can charge a price that covers the variable cost of each unit shipped. There is an anti-competitive
eﬀect of the safeguard tariﬀ, assuming that the price elasticity of demand ε∗ falls as the European
ﬁrm’s market share in the US decreases.
The model suggests two channels through which the mark-up of the EU ﬁrm is aﬀected, through
import penetration and trade costs. We consider the vector of mark-ups, e μ,t h a tc o n s i s t so ft h e
mark-up attributed to the output for the EU market, μ = P
c , and the mark-up attributed to the
output exported to the US, μ∗ = P
∗
c
g+τ .L e tu sd e ﬁne the equilibrium import penetration ratio as
the share of EU imports over total EU output, that is e m =
e y
e x+e y. Thus, the mark-up of the EU ﬁrm
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Intuitively, the EU ﬁrm exhibits a lower mark-up attributed to its exports due to trade costs, g
and τ. Equation (3.8) leads to Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 An introduction of the US safeguard tariﬀ into the reciprocal dumping model aﬀects
the EU mark-up negatively, moreover, the mark-up of the EU ﬁrm is:
1. decreasing with the level of the US safeguard tariﬀ,a n d












)2 < 0, given c ∧ τ>0,w h e r e0 ≤ g ≤ 1;
2.
∂μ
∂m = − mε
(m+ε−1)2 < 0, given ε ∧ m>0.
Now that the model has shown that mark-ups of EU ﬁrms are negatively aﬀected by the level
of the US safeguard tariﬀ and US import penetration, we take these results to the data to examine
the relation between prices and marginal costs. If European steel producers absorb a part of the
tariﬀ, we expect the US safeguard tariﬀ to be imperfectly passed through to US price of subject
p r o d u c t sl e a d i n gt oad e c l i n ei nμ∗,t h em a r k - u pa s s o c i a t e dw i t hE Ue x p o r t st ot h eU S .I n c r e a s e d
competition in turn reduces the mark-up of the EU ﬁrm in the EU market.






) < 0 (3.9)
9T h en e g a t i v ee ﬀect of the US tariﬀ on the EU ﬁrm’s proﬁt will depend on the elasticity of
demand in the US and the size of its exports there. The European ﬁrm could thus preserve the
level of its mark-ups, if it were able to reroute its exports to non-protected markets.
Our theoretical framework provides intuition for the empirical analysis in the next section.
Using a large panel of the European steel producers, we expect both import penetration and the
US safeguard tariﬀ to have a negative eﬀect on the mark-up of the EU ﬁrm14.I n t u i t i v e l y ,t h eE U
ﬁrm faces larger costs per unit of the output shipped than under free trade, so that the US tariﬀ
shifts the best response function of the EU ﬁrm inwards in the US market and thus diminishes
market power of the European ﬁrm.
4 Empirical Analysis
In this section we look for empirical evidence that could conﬁrm the predictions above. Earlier
literature proposes diﬀerent approaches to estimate ﬁrms’ price mark-ups. Our methodology is
based upon the Roeger (1995) methodology. This methodology is well suited for our ﬁrm-level data
and was before successfully applied by Konings and Vandenbussche (2005).
The Roeger approach carries the Hall’s (1988) insights regarding decomposition of the Solow
residual (Solow, 1957) into a mark-up component and a pure technology component. We ﬁnd the
Hall approach unsuitable for our analysis, because it requires instruments to control for simultane-
ity bias. Instruments would control for the ﬁrm’s adjustment of factor demands in response to
productivity shocks. However, it is hard to ﬁnd instruments controlling for pure demand shocks.
Further, instruments may potentially be correlated with factor stock growth but not with tran-
sitory productivity growth, causing spurious correlation with the trade regime as found out by
Abbott, Griliches, and Hausman (1989). Since ﬁrms face no adjustment costs in the Hall approach,
the measurement error is counter-cyclic and productivity growth tends to be pro-cyclic, leading to
downward biased estimates of price mark-ups.
On the other hand, one could think of applying the Bresnahan (1989) approach that uses the New
Empirical Industrial Organization techniques to estimate price mark-ups through the responsiveness
of prices to changes in demand elasticities and cost components. That structural approach has been
already applied in earlier empirical research15. But since it requires detailed data on unit prices and
quantities to estimate demand elasticities of particular industry it is inappropriate for our study.
14The empirical literature provides support that mark-ups fall with import competition, since foreign competition
increases the elasticity of demand that domestic ﬁrms face. For a more detailed survey of this literature see Feenstra
(1995) and Tybout (2003).
15Genovese and Wallace (1998) overcome the identiﬁcation of the demand parameter without complete cost infor-
mation and measure price mark-ups in the sugar industry by ﬁrst selecting a type of demand equation, i.e. quadratic,
linear, log-linear or exponential, and then deriving the supply function with instrumented demand parameters.
10Our research is limited by company accounts data that do not include these ﬁgures.
Roeger (1995) and Olley and Pakes (1996) suggest models that go beyond the Hall approach.
Olley and Pakes (1996) overcome a simultaneity problem generated by the relationship between
productivity and demand for production factors. Their model circumvents the selection and simul-
taneity biases by developing a semi-parametric estimator for the production function parameters
within the behavioral framework16. Because their approach requires longer time spans and can be
applied only to ﬁrms with positive capital investments, it is less appropriate for our case.
Roeger (1995) develops a model that requires neither instrumentation nor deﬂators for output
and production factor prices. His model is based upon the Solow (1957) model that has shown that
the change of total factor productivity can be measured from observed data directly for a constant
returns technology with the additional assumption of perfect competition17. Roeger (1995) similarly
to Hall (1988) decomposes the Solow residual, but argues that the dual Solow residual, consisting
of output and production factor prices, nests the same productivity term that will cancel out if the
dual Solow residual is deducted from the primal Solow residual (Martins et al., 1996; Konings and
Vandenbussche, 2005).
Earlier research signalled certain drawbacks of the Roeger methodology. One drawback of his
method stems from assuming constant returns to scale. In contrast to Hall (1988), Roeger assumes
constant returns to scale (CRS), implying an estimation bias depending on actual returns to scale.
Relaxing the CRS assumption, the mark-up should be discounted for the term ξit,r e p r e s e n t i n gt h e




ξit .T h i st e r m
indicates that there is downward (upward) bias in the mark-up levels under decreasing (increasing)
returns to scale. Another drawback may stem from the use of company accounts data. Using aggre-
gated industry-level data like in Roeger (1995), it is more plausible to assume that the unobservable
measurement error cancels out. Using ﬁrm-level data it may be less accurate to consider that the
unobservable measurement term cancels out due to ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity diﬀerentials.
Taking drawbacks into account we do not aim to present an exhaustive analysis of ﬁrms’ mark-
ups in the steel sector, but would like to indicate whether or not US safeguard measures aﬀected
market power of European steel producers. Our primary goal is to indicate the change in the av-
erage ﬁrm’s mark-up controlling for unobservable ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects and not to explain productivity
diﬀerentials between heterogeneous ﬁrms. Moreover, using the ﬁrm-level data, Konings and Van-
denbussche (2005) successfully apply the Roeger (1995) approach for estimating mark-up changes
of domestic ﬁrms subject to EU antidumping policies.
16Pavcnik (2002) successfully applies their methodology for estimating the productivity changes following trade
liberalization in Chile.
17In the same manner, Hulten (1986) calculated the change in total factor productivity using data on output and
production factor prices.
114.1 The Empirical Model
We employ the Roeger methodology that allows a direct estimation of price mark-ups to estimate
whether US safeguard protection had a negative impact on mark-ups of European steel producers18.
Similar to Hall (1988) and Konings and Vandenbussche (2005), we consider a linear homogenous
production function G(Kit,L it,M it)Eit for output Qit,w h e r eKit, Lit,a n dMit are capital, labor
and material inputs, and Eit is a shift variable representing changes in productivity eﬃciency for a
ﬁrm i at time t.
Using the Solow residual, Hall (1988) measures the productivity growth as the output growth
net weighted production factors growth, described as:
SRit = 4qit − (1 − αLit − αMit) 4 kit − αLit 4 lit − αMit4 mit (4.1)
where small letters refer to logarithms and the shares of labor and material costs in total sales
(PitQit)o fﬁrm i at time t are denoted by αLit = FLitLit
PitQit and αMit = FMitMit
PitQit with F and P
representing input and output prices. The novelty of the Roeger (1995) paper is to show that
under imperfect competition, the sum of input shares per unit is below one due to the existence
of a mark-up term. Decomposition of the mark-up and the technology component is therefore a
crucial step in the Roeger approach and it can be expressed in the following form:
SRit = λit(4qit − 4kit)+( ξit − λit) 4 eit (4.2)
where λit = Pit−cit
Pit is the Lerner index for a ﬁrm i at time t. The right hand side is decomposed
in the mark-up and the pure technology component. The relationship between the price and the
marginal cost is established through the coeﬃcient λit that is directly related to the mark-up over
the marginal cost (μit), i.e. λit =
μit−ξit
μit ,w h e r eξit denotes the sum of input costs in the ﬁrm’s
cost function and equals 1 under constant returns to scale, as assumed in Roeger (1995)19.T h e
price-based or the dual Solow residual (SRPit)i st h e nd e ﬁned from this relationship between the
marginal cost and the output price and it can be expressed in the following form:
SRPit =( 1 − αLit − αMit) 4 FKit + αLit 4 FLit + αMit 4 FMit− 4pit
=( 1 − λit) 4 eit − λit(4pit − 4FKit) (4.3)
18For a detailed overview of the Roeger methodology, refer to Roeger (1995), Martins et al. (1996) and Konings
and Vandenbussche (2005).
19Roeger shows that the change in marginal cost is a weighted average of changes in input prices (FIit)w i t h
respect to their relative cost shares in the ﬁrm’s cost function (φIit), accounting for the change in technology (eit),
i.e. 4cit = φIit4FIit − 4eit. Hence, cit = Pit(1 − λit) ⇐⇒
Pit
cit = μit = 1
1−λit .
12where FKit denotes the price of capital employed in the production function. The innovation
of Roeger (1995) stems from using SRPit to substitute for a change in productivity eﬃciency of
a ﬁrm i at time t, i.e. 4eit in Equation (4.2). Similar to Konings and Vandenbussche (2005) we
obtain the expression:
SRit − SRPit =
1
λit
[4qit + 4pit − αLit(4lit + 4FLit) − (4.4)
αMit(4mit + 4FMit) − (1 − aLit − aMit)(4kit + 4FKit)] + uit
where uit represents the diﬀerence between measurement errors in SRit and SRPit and equals
zero, since both forms are assumed to have the same unobservable productivity term. Since the
Lerner index under the constant returns to scale is deﬁned as λit = Pit−cit
Pit =
μit−1
μit ,w er e w r i t e
Equation (4.4) to directly estimate the price mark-up (μit)t e r m :
(4qit + 4pit) − (4kit + 4FKit)=μit(φLit 4 ΩLit + φMit4 ΩMit) (4.5)
where 4ΩLit and 4ΩMit represent the growth rates in labor and material costs per value of
capital costs in ﬁrm i at time t20. Our core model is then speciﬁed as:
4Yit = μit 4 Xit (4.6)
In line with the Roeger approach that the growth rate in output is explained by the growth rate
in inputs times the mark-up term, our left-hand side variable (4Yit) represents the growth rate in
sales per value of capital for a ﬁrm i at time t. The right hand side explanatory variable (4Xit)
stands for a vector of the growth rate in inputs weighted by their shares in total sales.
4.2 Description of Data
The data used in this study are the annual company accounts data compiled from Amadeus (2006)
organized by the Bureau van Dijk. The data cover the industry of basic metals across EU-15
countries for the period 1995-2004. We focus our study on those ﬁrms that have reported their
primary activity in this sector. The additional annual data on control variables, i.e. the real GDP
growth rates and the product-level trade data, are downloaded from Ameco and Eurostat.
Industry selection was guided by the oﬃcial statements from the White House Press on the
US Steel Products Proclamation from March 2002. This information is used for identifying the
20For brevity reasons we express 4ΩLit and 4ΩMit as 4ΩLit =( 4lit+4FLit)−(4kit +4FKit) and 4ΩMit =
(4mit + 4FMit) − (4kit + 4FKit).
13products subject to US safeguard protection. From this source, we obtain the necessary information
about the type, the level, and the length of US safeguard tariﬀs. We use the services of the Tariﬀ
Information Center to classify protected products according to the 8-digit HTS of the US. Under
the Chapter 99 within the Section XXII on Special Temporary Legislation, we identify subject
products and match them with products speciﬁed in the Section XV on Base Metals and Articles of
Base Metal product descriptions. The majority of activities involved in the production of subject
products can be classiﬁed under the 2-digit HTS 72 code and the minority of activities, i.e. those
involved in the production of certain welded tubular products, under the HTS 73 code. Using the
convergence key between the HTS and the PRODCOM industry classiﬁcations we identify groups
of activities at the 4-digit NACE Rev.1.1 level. We denote aﬀected ﬁrms as those that are engaged
in the production of subject products. Each ﬁrm in Amadeus has a trade description that allows
for identifying activities pertinent to production of subject products.
The variables used in our econometric model are the following. The ﬁrm level operating revenue
in each year provided in Amadeus is used to proxy the sales variable. For the value of capital we
use the book value of tangible ﬁxed assets for each ﬁrm in each year. The labor costs reported
in Amadeus proxy the wage bill variable. Material costs variable is simply proxied by the ﬁrm-
level total material costs consisting of the factor price multiplied by the quantity of materials. We
constructed the capital intensity variable using the book value of tangible ﬁxed assets for each ﬁrm
in each year over the corresponding book value of total assets. The country-level real GDP growth
rates, the real long term interest rates, and the price index of investment goods are obtained from
the Ameco database from the ECFIN department at the European Commission.
Our ﬁrm-level data covers 2,241 ﬁrms, among which we distinguish between less and more
diversiﬁed ﬁrms. Firms that do not report any secondary activity are referred to as single-product
ﬁrms. These are likely to have less diversiﬁed production than multi-product ﬁrms. Multi-product
ﬁrms by contrast refer to ﬁrms reporting at least one activity under the secondary NACE code.
Table 2 presents the structure of the treated industry and some descriptive statistics including main
indicators of the average ﬁrm’s performance, size, and productivity.
[Insert Table 2 here]
The ﬁrst pass at the data suggests there might be diﬀerences in the responsiveness of ﬁrms
to the US safeguard tariﬀ.T h eﬁrst column describes the number of aﬀected ﬁrms in the Roeger
speciﬁcation. Our dataset consists of over two thirds of single-product ﬁrms that on average exhibit
a bit lower degree of competition for their products than multi-product ﬁrms21. Regarding the
21The Lerner index is proxied by value added over total sales using the price-cost margin (PCM) method that is
explained at the end of this section.
14structure of the industry, only 19 percent of multi-product ﬁrms are active in directly aﬀected
industry of basic metals. Multi-product ﬁrms predominantly active in basic metals industry were
on average larger in terms of sales and employment (L) and performed better, gaining higher returns
on assets (ROA) at similar value added per worker (VA / L ). An interesting observation is that 21
percent of multi-product ﬁrms were active in non-manufacturing sector, i.e. engaged in ﬁnancial
services, retail sector, and others. These were on average among the largest ﬁrms.
Descriptive statistics on the price-cost margin (the Lerner index) of an average ﬁrm reveal an
interesting pattern that motivates our empirical model. Figure 2 presents the evolution of mark-ups
for diﬀerent groups of European steel producers. A sharp decline in mark-ups in 2002 was followed
by an upswing one year after. Figure 2 suggests that safeguard protection (denoted by a vertical
line) might have contributed to this decline in mark-ups.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
Figure 2 suggests that although European steel producers may indeed be adversely aﬀected
by US safeguards in 2002-2003, they recovered rather fast. Increased diﬀerentials between output
and input prices in production of subject products might have enabled European ﬁrms to recover
previous mark-up levels22. Figures 3 and 4 moreover suggest that it is reasonable to expect an
eﬀect of trade rerouting on market power of European steel producers.
[Insert Figures 3 and 4 here]
Figure 3 presents a persistent growth in European external trade ﬂows in subject products
during 1995-2004. A closer view into the composition of the trade ﬂows reveals that some European
exports of subject products to the US were depressed and rerouted to China and other countries,
as observed in Figure 4 that plots the trade ﬂows between the EU-15 and its main trading partners
in subject products23. Large diversiﬁed ﬁrms like Thyssen Krupp and Corus, which attribute less
than ﬁve percent of their production to US exports, could probably rebalance their losses with a
greater ease by rerouting their exports to third countries.
By contrast, small and export-orientated producers potentially generated larger losses propor-
tional to their output scales. European steel producers suﬀered increased import penetration non
22The world steel market has become highly competitive and abundant with steel leading to signiﬁcant price
reduction of crude coil from nearly $500 in 1996 to below $300 by the end of 2002. However, increased world demand
for steel skyrocketed the price of crude coil steel up to $600 in 2004. By contrast, there has been much less turmoil
in the world prices of production factors in steel manufacturing (Datastream, 2006), which oﬀers an explanation to
the fast recovery of EU mark-ups in 2004.
23According to the EU trade statistics, were Japan (34.8 million tons), the EU-15 (31.8 mt), Russia (30.4 mt),
Ukraine (28.2 mt), and China (20.0 mt) the largest steel exporting countries in 2004. The largest steel importing
countries at that time were China (33.2 mt), US (32.8 mt), the EU-15 (30.4 mt), and South Korea (17.7mt). There
has been a rapid growth in steel production elsewhere in the world, leading to a sharp decline in the EU’s traditional
trade surplus in iron and steel products. The EU steel imports have increased from 14.5 million tons in 1997 to 24.6
million tons in 2002.
15only in their home market after 2001, but also in third country markets. The largest imports of
subject products came from Russia. Large Russian producers, like Severstal, that directly compete
with US integrated steel producers might have rerouted their exports from the US to the EU market
and third markets due to imposition of US safeguard measures24.
4.3 Results
Our preferred econometric approach is a ﬁxed eﬀects model that allows controlling for unobservable
ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects25. As noted above, we estimate separately mark-ups for each group
of European producers of subject products by a log-linear model, controlling for industry and
year speciﬁce ﬀects. The Roeger approach allows us to directly estimate mark-ups of an average
European steel producer of subject products. In our basic empirical speciﬁcation, we estimate
whether there was a statistically signiﬁcant change in mark-ups in the period of US safeguard
protection, from 2002 to 2003:
∆Y it= αi+μ1∆Xit+μ2[∆XitSG]+μ3[∆XitGDPjt]+β1GDP jt+εit (4.7)
Our explained variable, ∆Yit, represents the output growth per value of capital. Our composite
explanatory variable, ∆Xit, includes the growth of nominal inputs weighted by factor shares in
sales for each ﬁrm i at time t. The results for each group of European steel producers are reported
in Table 326.I n t h e ﬁrst column we present our explanatory variables, controlling for business
cycles by using real GDP growth rates to proxy for country-level shifts of demand. In the second
column we report results of our ﬁrst model speciﬁcation (1), where we estimate mark-ups jointly
for all European producers of subject products. The coeﬃcient μ1 refers to the level of mark-ups
of European ﬁrms. The coeﬃcient is statistically diﬀerent from 1 and implies that the output price
exceeded the marginal cost by around 37 percent.
[Insert Table 3 here]
24In response to Russian import penetration, the EU reached the agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters
with the Russian Federation in August 2003, establishing a double-checking system without quantitative limits in
respect of the export of certain steel products from the Russian Federation to the EU (EC 22003A0828(01) ).
25Following the results of the Hausman test we prefer a ﬁxed eﬀects model over a random eﬀects model, although
our results did not alter much using diﬀerent speciﬁcations. The F-test indicated that ﬁxed eﬀects were signiﬁcant
in all four model speciﬁcations. In models with interaction eﬀects we also include the main eﬀects of the variables
that were used to compute the interaction terms to exclude the possibility that main eﬀects and interaction eﬀects
are confounded. The selection bias is less of an issue, since mark-ups until 2002 did not exhibit a signiﬁcant upward
or downward trend. In all econometric models we include industry and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
26We construct our capital variable in line with Konings and Vandenbussche (2005) as the user cost of capital
multiplied by its nominal value. We deﬁne the user value of capital as Zjt(rt+δit), where we consider a country-level
price index of investment goods, Zjt, a long-term real interest rate rt at time t, and depreciation of capital δit of
the average rate of 10 percent. We simulated the sensitivity of mark-ups towards diﬀerent depreciation rates, price
indices of investment goods, and real interest rates. Allowing for up to 5 percent changes, our point estimates vary
within the range of 1 percent, without altering the signs of estimated coeﬃcients.
16The coeﬃcient μ2 is of our main concern, since it denotes a decrease in average mark-ups after
imposition of US safeguards. We interact our composite variable ∆Xit with a dummy variable
SG denoting safeguard measures, taking values 1 in 2002-2003 and 0 otherwise. We cannot reject
the hypothesis at the 1 percent conﬁdence level that mark-ups remained unchanged in years 2002
and 2003. The point estimates suggest a decline of 11 percent in average mark-ups following US
safeguard protection in 2002. The negative sign on GDP suggests counter-cyclicality of mark-
ups consistent with Konings and Vandenbussche (2005)27.I ns p e c i ﬁcations (2) and (3), where we
consider multi- and single-product ﬁrms, we also ﬁnd highly signiﬁcant decline in their mark-ups.
The level of mark-ups for multi-product ﬁrms (2) is on average larger than for single-product
ﬁrms during 1995-2004, enabling multi-product ﬁr m st os u p p r e s sm a r k - u p sb ym o r et h a ns i n g l e -
product ﬁrms (3). Multi-product ﬁrms beneﬁt from scale economies as they spread ﬁxed costs over
a larger number of units, thus operating on the downward sloping part of the average cost curve.
Single-product ﬁrms, however, suﬀered more from US protection as they on average exhibit lower
mark-ups during US protection. Referring to Table 2, around 80 percent of multi-product ﬁrms
are active in other than basic metal sectors. Their presence in fabricated steel and retail sectors
allows them to charge mark-ups accordingly with product characteristics. Exploiting variation in
own- and cross-product demand elasticities, enables mark-up diﬀerentials between diﬀerent types
of ﬁrms28.
4.4 Discussion and Robustness of Results
4.4.1 Safeguard Tariﬀs, Import Penetration and Trade Diversion
Figures 1 and 4 suggest that mark-ups of European steel producers may be aﬀected indirectly by
rerouted trade ﬂows. To answer the question whether the overall decline in mark-ups in 2002-
2003 is associated with the level of US safeguard tariﬀ and the increased EU imports of subject
products, we extend the model by decomposing the mark-up change. Following intuition provided
by (3.8), we ﬁrst account for export intensity of an average European steel producer to the US,
conditional on tariﬀ levels. Second, we consider increased competition in the EU market due to
import penetration. The extended model is speciﬁed as:
27The real GDP growth rate in our data lies around 2 percent.
28Multi-product ﬁrms use basic steel intermediates further into fabrication process, allowing for larger mark-up
diﬀerentials. Further fabrication of steel increases the degree of product diﬀerentiation, where ﬁrms are able to charge
diﬀerent mark-ups according to product characteristics and quality diﬀerences, unobserved to econometrician. See
Berry et al. (1995), Goldberg and Verboven (2001), and Verboven (1996) on this point. Further, large multi-product
ﬁrms are able to operate at lower unit production costs by recycling scrap steel and internalizing the energy and raw
material costs.
17∆Y it = αi+γ1∆Xit+γ2[∆Xittariffkt]+γ3[∆XitSGmkt]+γ4[∆XitSGxkt]
+γ5[∆Xitmkt]+γ6[∆Xitxkt]+γ7[∆XitGDPjt]+β1GDPjt+uit (4.8)
Hence, γ2 in (4.8) is the mark-up change associated with exports to the US in 2002-2003 and
conditional on the tariﬀ level imposed on each exported subject product k in year t,a n dγ3 is the
m a r k - u pc h a n g ea s s o c i a t e dw i t hi m p o r tp e n e t r a t i o n ,mkt,i n t oE Um a r k e to fas u b j e c tp r o d u c t
k in year t in 2002-200329. The estimated coeﬃcient γ4 denotes the mark-up change associated
with the external EU-15 export intensity during US safeguard protection. Further, ∆Xitmkt and
∆Xitxkt, control for the mark-up change associated with the external EU-15 import penetration
and the external EU-15 export intensity during the period 1995-2004.
A potential problem pervading our estimation strategy is the reverse causality between the
growth in the ﬁrm’s output and trade, arising from the relation between productivity and open-
ness. While low productive EU ﬁrms lobby for protectionism, some high productive EU ﬁrms self
select themselves to export. Similarly, some foreign ﬁrms may export to the EU because of the pre-
vailing market structure. We instrument trade ﬂows with product-speciﬁc rather than ﬁrm-speciﬁc

























dkt denote total EU-15 imports, EU-15 exports, and EU-15 pro-
duction of a subject product k at year t. The results presented in Table 4 indicate that the average
mark-up of both multi- and single-product ﬁrms is negatively associated with import penetration
and export intensity to the US, conditional on the tariﬀ levels. Mark-ups are shown to be decreasing
with the level of the US safeguard tariﬀ. For the sample of all ﬁrms (1) in Table 4, we indicate
that a percentile change in tariﬀs leads to a statistically highly signiﬁcant decline in mark-ups of 3
percent.
[Insert Table 4 here]
29Import penetration in our data ranges from 10 to 80 percent for scrap and basic steel to tin-mill products,
respectively. Export penetration ranges from 10 to 60 percent for same groups of products. On average, both import
penetration and export intensity lie around 20 percent over 10 year sample period and across all 4-digit industries.
Diﬀerences in trade costs explain a great part in variation of openness to trade across industries.
30The industry averages of trade ﬂows in tons are aggregated across all ﬁrms reporting their activity in the 4-
digit sector, where an 8-digit product is produced. The synthetic index of Economic Freedom of the World or the
Warner&Sachs index of openness are not appropriate instruments, since they do not directly measure the impact of
US safegaurd measures in 2002.
18While both multi-product (2) and single-product ﬁrms (3) exhibit a 2.5 percent decline in mark-
ups associated with exports to the US, multi-product ﬁrms (2) respond intensively to US safeguard
protection with a 2.6 percent decline in mark-ups associated with import penetration during 2002-
200331. Regarding rerouting of trade suggested by Figures 3 and 4, in particular to China after 2002,
we control for trade ﬂows in the whole sample period and further interact them with the safeguard
dummy, taking 1 in years 2002 and 2003. Mark-ups are decreasing with import penetration of an
average magnitude of 6 percent. Overall, import penetration has a disciplining eﬀect on mark-
ups of European steel producers throughout the period 1995-2004. During safeguard protection, a
percentile increase in export intensity is strongly associated with a percentile increase in mark-ups
of multi-product ﬁrms and negatively associated with mark-ups of single-product ﬁrms.
4.4.2 The Magnitude of the Policy Impact
In this sub-section we discuss factors contributing to the large eﬀect of US safeguard tariﬀso n
mark-ups of EU steel producers. First, US safeguard protection was anticipated already in the
beginning of 2001, when the US ITC initiated the investigation of material injury in the US steel
industry. Along with exceptionally high preliminary safeguard tariﬀs of more than 40 percent, early
anticipation of the event partially accounts for the fast response of European ﬁrms. At that time,
safeguard protection was scheduled for 4 years for 10 groups of subject products. Furthermore, the
Amadeus data is reported at the end of each year.
Second, even though controlling for surrounding events, the large decrease in EU mark-ups may
still partially reﬂect the compound eﬀect of ongoing antidumping policies associated with subject
steel products. Due to limitations of the Amadeus data, where the ﬁrm’s activity is described at
4-digits, we cannot completely control for all 21 anti-dumping orders against EU exporters that
were outstanding on products already covered by US safeguard measures. However, we expect them
to magnify the downward eﬀect on mark-ups of EU steel ﬁrms. The high magnitude of the eﬀect of
safeguards on EU mark-ups partially resembles an overriding eﬀect of antidumping and antitrust
policies in the US and the EU market32.
Finally, the estimated change in mark-ups represents a lower bound value. We do not observe
the share of sales of a ﬁrm i at time t dedicated to exports in our data and total sales in Amadeus
are reported at the 4-digit activity-level and not at the 8-digit product-level. Further identiﬁcation
31Tariﬀs range from 7 to 30 per cent and are imposed on each unit of subject product imported by the US. Thus,
both multi- and single-product ﬁrms face equal increase in unit costs of traded steel.
32Even though safeguard protection has already been terminated after 2 years, a total of 21 anti-dumping orders
against the EU exporters are outstanding on products already covered by the safeguard measures. The termination
of safeguard actions does not have any impact on the outstanding AD and CVD orders (EC, 2006). Mark-ups could
partially reﬂect changes in market structure as a result of ongoing consolidation process in the EU steel sector. The
merger of Aceralia, Arbed and Usinor into Arcelor, was oﬃcially launched in February 2001 and became eﬀective
one year later, when the Arcelor share was listed on several stock exchanges.
19of export intensive and export less intensive ﬁrms would add to the robustness of our results. To
circumvent these problems, we could think of estimating product speciﬁc mark-ups employing the
trade data rather than the ﬁrm data33. In presence of the increasing returns to scale, estimates of
mark-up changes are likely to be downward biased due to the constant returns to scale assumption.
Interacting our composite regressor ∆Xit with a dummy variable SG, taking 1 in 2002 and 0 oth-
erwise, we ﬁnd an even larger and a highly signiﬁcant decrease in mark-ups in model speciﬁcations
(1), (2), and (3). Assuming the constant returns to scale, the Roeger method leads to overestimated
mark-up levels and underestimated mark-up changes in case of the increasing returns to scale34.
If the unobservable term uit in Equation (4.4) would cancel out, we would be able to explain all
variation in the data. However despite the high goodness of ﬁt, about 10 percent of the variance
remains unexplained in all model speciﬁcations.
4.4.3 Control Group
In order to ensure that mark-ups of EU producers of subject products decreased due to US safeguard
protection and not due to some phenomenon in the European manufacturing sector, we construct a
control group of ﬁrms. We identify ﬁrms that are not likely to be directly involved in production of
subject products and were not subject to ongoing competition or trade policy investigation. Firms
in our counterfactual sample have on average similar characteristics as ﬁrms in the treated sample,
but do not report to be active in production of subject products or fabricated steel products, using
subject products as intermediates. We have experimented with diﬀerent random counterfactual
samples of ﬁrms within diﬀerent industries, obtaining similar results.
In speciﬁcation (4), we present mark-up estimations for randomly selected ﬁrms from the man-
ufacturing sectors unlikely to be aﬀected by US safeguards35. Interpreting the coeﬃcient μ2 in the
last column of Table 3, we can reject the hypothesis that mark-ups have declined in 2002 and 2003.
Similar to our treated samples (1), (2), and (3) we ﬁnd mark-ups to be statistically diﬀerent from
1, implying imperfect competition in the counterfactual industries. We can exclude the possibility
that a decrease in mark-ups was driven by a common EU-15 industry eﬀect.
33One alternative is motivated by the Goldberg and Knetter (1999) approach. They estimate market power in
segmented export markets by the elasticity of residual demand exporters face. The residual demand elasticity is
identiﬁed by exchange rate shocks which rotate the supply relation of the exporting group relative to other ﬁrms in
the market. This approach allows the use of product-level data on values and quantities of exports. The described
approach would, however, include limited ﬁrm speciﬁci n f o r m a t i o na n di st h u sl e s ss u i t a b l ef o ro u rr e s e a r c hq u e s t i o n .
34Further, we only partially capture the magnitude of mark-up change pertinent to products classiﬁed at 8-digit
level, because we estimate mark-ups on basis of 4-digit ﬁrm data. Our data does not provide information on product
related sales and factor costs.
35Firms within the steel sector are not considered as a control group due to following reasons. First, the steel
industry accounted for about one third of all antidumping cases and has been subject to several antitrust investi-
gations in the last decades. It is hard to disentangle the compound eﬀect of diﬀerent policies concerning basic and
fabricated steel products. Secondly, basic steel products subject to US safeguard protection in 2002 are likely to
be employed in further processing downstream the production within industries like fabricated steel, transportation
vehicles, and IT sector.
204.4.4 Alternative Speciﬁcations
To verify the results obtained with the Roeger speciﬁcation, we discuss here an alternative esti-
mation method. As our core alternative model we borrow a price-cost margin (PCM) approach
discussed in Tybout (2003). The empirical model is based upon a simple theoretical pricing model
with imperfect competition, assuming static proﬁt maximizing behavior of ﬁrms. This approach is
based upon the Lerner index, describing a proﬁt maximizing ﬁrm’s marginal costs (Pit
cit )a tt i m et as
a decreasing function of the price elasticity of demand (ε)t h a tﬁrm i faces when selling the output






with the corresponding price mark-up μit.
The intuition implies that US safeguards aﬀect its own protected market elasticity of demand in a
negative manner and allow for higher price mark-ups. The price-cost margin (PCMit)c a nt h e nb e









We follow the common estimation approach discussed in Konings and Vandenbussche (2005)
and use the observed ﬁrm-level price-cost margin deﬁned as sales net of expenditures on labor
and materials over sales, i.e. PCM it =
(PitQit−PMitMit−PLitLit)
PitQit for ﬁrm i at year t.I n o r d e r t o
verify the results in Table 3, we estimate mark-ups of a pooled sample of ﬁrms, using the following
regression equation:
PCMit= αi+δ1SG+ δ2KIit+δ3VA p w itSG+ δ4GDPjt+ξit (4.10)
where αi represents the unobserved ﬁrm speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects and ξit a white noise error term.
The regressions include controls on capital intensity (KIit) for ﬁrm i at time t,d e ﬁned as a ratio
of capital to total assets, the real GDP growth in country j at time t (GDPit), a dummy variable
for safeguard measures (SG), taking values 1 for the period 2002-2003 and 0 otherwise, and year
dummies. In particular, we are interested in whether ﬁrms could maintain the mark-up level by
charging higher output prices or by increasing productivity of their labor force. We do not observe
data on prices and therefore control for value added created by each employee (VA p w it).I nf a c t ,t o
disentangle its eﬀect on mark-ups after safeguards were imposed, we interact this variable with SG
taking value 1 in 2002-2003. Table 5 presents the results of the PCM model. In the ﬁrst three model
speciﬁcations, we indicate a statistically highly signiﬁcant decrease in mark-ups in 2002-2003.
[Insert Table 5 here]
We obtain even more powerful results, when imposing a safeguard dummy only in the year
2002. In all model speciﬁcations we ﬁnd an average decrease in mark-ups of about 3 percentage
21points. Furthermore, it seems that an average EU ﬁrm increased its value added per employee
in 2002-2003. The results are not likely to be driven by a common industry factor, since for our
counterfactual sample of ﬁrms we can reject the hypothesis that mark-ups have changed in 2002-
2003. We experimented also with other model speciﬁcations, expressing mark-ups as an input-
output ratio. We estimated the average mark-up to be around 15 percent and found a similar
negative change in mark-ups in the period 2002-2003.
5C o n c l u s i o n
Safeguard measures, together with antidumping measures, have become the prevalent instruments
for imposing import restrictions. While previous micro-econometric research focuses on domestic
producers, it largely neglects the eﬀects of safeguard measures on foreign exporters. Our study con-
siders the externalities of administered trade protection for foreign exporters. To this end, we show
that US safeguard protection on steel in 2002 adversely aﬀected mark-ups of EU steel producers.
We ﬁnd that mark-ups of EU steel producers on average declined by 11 percent during US safeguard
protection. Single-product ﬁrms saw their markups decline by more than multi-product ﬁrms. Our
results also suggest that European steel exporters partially absorbed US safeguard tariﬀs. We show
that the higher levels of US safeguard tariﬀs were associated with larger declines in mark-ups of
EU steel producers.
Controlling for unobservable ﬁrm heterogeneity with ﬁxed eﬀects, our results are robust to
alternative speciﬁcations. We can exclude the possibility that the decrease in mark-ups that we
ﬁnd was driven by a common EU industry eﬀect since we do not ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant
decrease in mark-ups for a randomly drawn control group of ﬁrms not subject to US safeguard
protection.
Our results have some interesting implications. First, safeguard protection aimed at fostering
domestic ﬁrms induces adverse externalities for foreign exporters. Our evidence further suggests
that US safeguard protection triggered domino eﬀects36.W e ﬁnd that US safeguard protection
resulted in some rerouting of European steel. For example, EU steel producers rerouted some of
their exports from the US to China during US protection. This resulted in a call for trade policy
action by Chinese steel producers. In 2003, China itself imposed safeguard measures on certain
steel products in response to a large inﬂux of the world’s steel during US safeguard protection.
Second, the response to US safeguard protection amongst EU steel ﬁrms was heterogeneous.
36The concept of domino eﬀects in the multilateral trade framework has been introduced into the international
trade literature in the early nineties by Baldwin (1993). His paper presents a theoretical model where an established
trade agreement can trigger requests from countries that were previously non-members. His model implies that one
country’s trade policy action can trigger echoing trade actions by other countries.
22Single-product ﬁrms suﬀered more from protection and their mark-ups decreased more than those
of multi-product ﬁrms indicating the larger dependency of single-product ﬁrms on adverse market
reactions. Multi-product ﬁrms appear to be less dependent on individual international markets
and seem to have a better ability to adjust their mark-ups to the high-variance trade shocks in the
global trade arena.
In conclusion, we ﬁnd a considerable negative eﬀect of US safeguards on EU mark-ups, suggesting
that one country’s safeguard protection generates adverse externalities for its trading partners.
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26APPENDIX A: Description of the Model in Section 3
An European and an US ﬁrm compete in a Cournot fashion and maximize their proﬁt functions
of the following form:
π = P(Q)x + P∗(Q∗)x∗ − c(x +
x∗
g
) − F − τx∗ (A.1)
π∗ = P∗(Q∗)y∗ + P(Q)y − c(y∗ +
y
g
) − F∗ (A.2)
where Q and Q∗ reﬂect the output sold in the EU and the US market. Both ﬁrms face iceberg
transport costs per unit of their shipments. The European ﬁrm’s exports to the US are additionally
constrained by the US safeguard tariﬀ.E a c hﬁrm maximizes its own output, which yields ﬁrst order
conditions and implies the best reply functions:
∂π
∂x∗ = p∗0x∗ + p∗ −
c
g
− τ =0⇐⇒ x∗(y∗):p∗ =
c
g
− τ − p∗0x∗ (A.3)
∂π∗
∂y∗ = p∗0y∗ + p∗ − c =0⇐⇒ y∗(x∗):p∗ = c − p∗0y∗ (A.4)
where primes denote ﬁrst derivatives and analogously could be shown for the EU market. Con-
sider now that the market share of the European ﬁrm in the US market is denoted by σ∗ = x∗
Q∗ and




∂p∗ , then the best







ε∗ + σ∗ − 1
(A.6)
and analogously the best reply functions can be derived for the EU market. The equilibrium
market shares and prices are then given in the US market as:
˜ σ∗ =





















ε(g − 1) + 1
1+g
(A.10)
This result shows that the European ﬁrm’s market share will be lower in the US market than the
US ﬁrm’s market share in the European market. The US safeguard tariﬀ shifts the best response
function of the EU ﬁrm inwards in the US market. In fact, the US tariﬀ diminishes the EU ﬁrm’s
market share in the US by more than it increases the US ﬁrm’s market share in the US.
In equilibrium, the European ﬁrm will maintain its market share in the US as long as it will ﬁnd
it proﬁtable to export. In other words, it needs to cover its costs per each unit of product sold in
the US, so that ˜ p∗ > c
g +τ>0∧ ˜ σ∗ > 0. Analogously will the US ﬁrm export to the EU market as
long as it gilts that ˜ p> c
g > 0 ∧ ˜ σ>0. Rewriting the equilibrium price levels in terms of demand













Furthermore, the EU ﬁrm will export to the US market as long as the tariﬀ τ is set below its
prohibitive level, i.e. as long as ¯ τ<
c(ε∗(g−1)+1)
g(ε∗−1) . This is an important implication of the model,
showing that the elasticity of demand in the US is lower than in the US due to the US safeguard
tariﬀ, i.e. ε∗ <ε.T h ea d v e r s ee ﬀect of the safeguard tariﬀ on mark-ups of the European ﬁrm can





ε∗,w h e r e
_
c = c + c
g + τ denotes the aggregate marginal costs of the European ﬁrm that
exceed marginal costs of the US ﬁrm by amount of the US tariﬀ imposed.
28APPENDIX B: Tables and Figures
Table 1: Subject products, tariﬀ levels, and US import market shares
Products HTS Tariﬀ Import sharea),b )
8-digit 2002 2003 1996 2001 2003
Flat steel & slabs 9903.72.30-14 30% 24% 38.75% 28.8% 25.4%
Tin mill products 9903.73.15-27 30% 24% N/A N/A N/A
Hot-rolled, cold-ﬁnished, and 9903.73.28-44; 30% 24% 13.8% 17.0% 16.4%
stainless steel bars and rods 9903.73.66-81 15% 12%
Reinforcing bars (rebars) 9903.73.45-50 15% 12% 1.7% 4.8% 3.4%
Welded tubular products 9903.73.51-62 15% 12% 0.8% 1.0% 1.5%
Fittings & ﬂanges 9903.73.66-72 13% 10% N/A N/A N/A
Stainless steel wire 9903.73.91-96 8% 7% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
TOTAL c) 9903.73.30-96 / / 73.9% 67.8% 61.0%
(all subject products) (excl. .73.73-90)
Notes:
a) Import share =
US general import tonnes of subject products
US general import tonnes of all basic metal products
b) Import market share statistics were obtained at the product-level. Notation N/A denotes
the data that were not available at the product-level. We report aggregated statistics on import
shares of hot-rolled, cold-ﬁnished and stainless steel bars.
c) All subject products include also a group of semi-ﬁnished products that were under US
safeguard protection. This group includes most of subject tin-mill products, ﬁttings and ﬂanges.
29Table 2: Summary statistics and overview of the industry
Aﬀected ﬁrms Total Obs. Lerner ROA Sales L VA/L
"Single"-product ﬁrms 1 662 10 335 0.26 4.0 29 680 110 55
Multi-product ﬁrms 579 3 793 0.22 4.7 22 060 101 44
(100%)
Basic metals 109 811 0.22 4.4 52 863 218 56
(NACE 27) (19%)
Fabricated metals 301 1 961 0.23 4.9 6 619 34 40
(NACE 28) (52%)
Manufacturing 457 3 053 0.23 5.0 18 575 82 44
(NACE 15-37) (79%)
Non-manufacturing 122 740 0.22 3.4 36 437 187 44
(else than NACE 15-37) (21%)
Notes:
a) The ﬁrst column presents total number of ﬁrms producing subject products. Percent-
ages in brackets denote the presence of multi-product ﬁrms in other sectors.
b) Remaining ﬁgures refer to the mean values across the sample of EU-15 countries over
1995-2004. Sales are reported in tons.
30Table 3: Estimation results, the Roeger method (Fixed eﬀects)
∆Y it= αi+μ1∆Xit+μ2[∆XitSG]+μ3[∆XitGDPjt]+β1GDP jt+εit
Variable Alla),b) Multi-product Single-product Counterfactualc)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Xit 1.3728∗∗∗ 1.4531∗∗∗ 1.3591∗∗∗ 1.1863∗∗∗
(0.0162) (0.0326) (0.0190) (0.0084)
∆XitSG -0.1090∗∗∗ -0.1435∗∗∗ -0.0681∗∗∗ 0.1154∗∗∗
(0.0155) (0.0259) (0.0068) (0.0087)
∆XitGDP jt -0.0699∗∗∗ -0.0902∗∗∗ -0.0355∗∗∗ 0.0144∗∗∗
(0.0055) (0.0102) (0.0058) (0.0030)
GDPjt -0.0248∗∗∗ -0.0134 -0.0355∗∗∗ -0.0149∗∗∗
(0.0046) (0.0088) (0.0058) (0.0025)
R2 0.90 0.92 0.88 0.85
Observations 9897 2620 7277 46553
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes:
a) Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. ***/**/* denote statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1/5/10% conﬁdence level.
b) All ﬁrms refer to aﬀected ﬁrms producing products subject to US safeguard
protection.
c) Counterfactual ﬁrms refer to ﬁrms in the manufacturing sectors that have on
average similar characteristics as all aﬀected ﬁrms, but were not subject to US
safeguard protection.
31Table 4: Estimation results, the Roeger method (Fixed eﬀects)
∆Y it= αi+γ1∆Xit+γ2[∆Xittariffkt]+γ3[∆XitSGmkt]+γ4[∆XitSGxkt]
+γ5[∆Xitmkt]+γ6[∆Xitxkt]+γ7[∆XitGDPjt]+β1GDPjt+uit
Variable Alla),b) Multi-product Single-product
(1) (2) (3)
∆Xit 1.3687∗∗∗ 1.4969∗∗∗ 1.3451∗∗∗
(0.0228) (0.0430) (0.0280)
∆Xittariffkt -0.0343∗∗∗ -0.0250∗ -0.0266∗∗
(0.0091) (0.0144) (0.0122)
∆XitSGmkt -0.0076∗∗∗ -0.0261∗∗∗ -0.0029
(0.0024) (0.0050) (0.0028)
∆XitSGxkt 0.0018 0.0089∗∗∗ -0.0055∗∗∗
(0.0017) (0.0034) (0.0020)
∆Xitmkt -0.0060∗∗∗ -0.0049∗ -0.0072∗∗∗
(0.0017) (0.0029) (0.0021)
∆Xitxkt 0.0016∗ -0.0009 0.0026∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0018) (0.0011)
∆XitGDP jt -0.0453∗∗∗ -0.0815∗∗∗ -0.0349∗∗∗
(0.0059) (0.0105) (0.0075)
GDPjt -0.0195∗∗∗ -0.0119 -0.0280∗∗∗
(0.0048) (0.0092) (0.0061)
R2 0.90 0.93 0.90
Observations 8412 2352 6060
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Notes:
a) Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. ***/**/* denote statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1/5/10% conﬁdence level.
b) All ﬁrms refer to aﬀected ﬁrms producing products subject to US safeguard
protection.
32Table 5: Estimation results, the PCM method (Fixed eﬀects)
PCMit= αi+δ1SG+ δ2KIit+δ3VA p w itSG+ δ4GDP jt+ξit
Variable Alla),b) Multi-product Single-product Counterfactualc)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SG -0.0307∗∗∗ -0.0174∗∗ -0.0372∗∗∗ 0.0242
(0.0056) (0.0091) (0.0068) (0.0255)
KIit -0.0861∗∗∗ -0.0406∗∗∗ -0.1074∗∗∗ -0.5578∗∗∗
(0.0098) (0.0009) (0.0113) (0.0067)
VA p w itSG 0.0001∗∗ -0.0000 0.0001∗∗∗ -6.4e-05
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (6.7e-05)
GDPjt 0.0015 -0.0050 0.0019 0.0206∗∗
(0.0023) (0.0044) (0.0028) (0.0109)
Constant 0.2838∗∗∗ 0.2548∗∗∗ 0.3000∗∗∗ 0.4116∗∗∗
(0.0061) (0.0113) (0.0072) (0.0274)
R2 0.74 0.72 0.73 0.49
Observations 8217 2077 6140 36576
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes:
a) Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. ***/**/* denote statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1/5/10% conﬁdence level.
b) All ﬁrms refer to aﬀected ﬁrms producing products subject to US safeguard
protection.
c) Counterfactual ﬁrms refer to ﬁrms in the manufacturing sectors that have on
average similar characteristics as all aﬀected ﬁrms, but were not subject to US
safeguard protection.
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